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Abstract 
 
The imbalance of Medicare financing and cost sharing consumption is rooted in the Medicare tax 
collection and its main purpose to serve the aged population. The unfairness of Medicare tax 
collection includes its regressivity for all income levels and the incomplete tax collection among 
income groups. Those suffering from premature death, especially black males, lose the chance to 
enjoy longevity and the coverage of Medicare. The solution to the unfair redistribution posited is: 
alteration of Medicare enrollment age for different races and sexes, differential Medicare tax 
based on the population characteristics, and progressive taxation on all individuals to raise 
Medicare funds. Meanwhile, the generational medical debts that strangle the national fiscal 
condition can be paid off by a heavier inheritance tax. 
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Unfair Contribution and Consumption in Medicare 
Medicare, a social insurance, aims to insure the elderly, 65 years and above, as well as 
patients of end-stage renal diseases and certain disabilities related to health care access and 
care, according to Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) (2005). Medicare is 
composed of four parts: A, B, C, and D (CMS, 2005). Each part has its own range of services 
and coverage. Part A aims to insure hospital care; part B covers clinical visits (CMS, 2005); 
and part C, Medicare Advantage, is specially designed to provide the elderly the access to use 
managed care and other health care (CMS, 2009). Part D of Medicare is for prescription 
drugs. The parts of Medicare differ not only in the coverage, but also in the financing. The 
four parts were created one by one and, as such, part A was 84.34% covered by Medicare tax 
in 2008, and part B was almost entirely covered by general revenue in 2008 (Henry J. Kaiser 
Family Foundation, 2009). This is the same case for Part D. Medicare is financed by the 
Medicare taxes collected from the employees and employers, (42.45% of total Medicare 
expenditure in 2008). General revenue funded 40.03% in 2008 and, beneficiary premiums 
funded 12.61% in 2008 (Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal 
Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds, 2009). Therefore, Medicare relies on the 
redistribution of taxes and contributions from the working class as well as the general 
revenue of taxes from the IRS (Internal Revenue Service). Since the financing of Medicare 
depends on the redistribution of funds, does the mechanism work well and really benefit the 
disadvantaged?  These are questions that in the author’s opinion beg to be answered. 
Method 
Participants in MEPS 
In the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), the 2006 consolidated household 
component data was used to estimate the individual health expenditure in Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) (2006). MEPS is an ongoing large-scale medical 
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expenditure survey in which enrolled individuals, families, employers and medical providers 
across the United States participate (AHRQ, 2008). MEPS only focuses on the non-
institutionalized civilians in the United States (AHRQ, 2008). The characteristics and 
construction of MEPS are based on a complex survey design, which enables the survey to 
estimate the national mean and variance among several groups (AHRQ, 2008).  
Materials and procedure 
By studying the participants in the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, their 
contribution to Medicare tax, total health expenditure and out-of-pocket payments were 
estimated as national representative statistics. Because MEPS is not a tax information survey, 
the Medicare tax was estimated by using 2.9% of the total wage, presuming that the 
interviewees provided total wage income that included the employer’s share of Medicare tax.  
The health expenditure of those above 65 years of age and their self-payment under 
Medicare was estimated. The benefits from Medicare were calculated as the difference 
between the expenditure and the self-payment under Medicare. The contribution of Medicare 
tax, the usage of total health expenditure and total out-of-pocket payments were categorized 
by race and sex. Races were categorized as non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, 
Hispanic and others. Poverty levels were categorized according to the federal poverty line 
and separated as poor/negative income (less than 100%), near poor (100% to less than 125%), 
low income (125% to less than 200%), middle income (200% to less than 400%), and high 
income (more than 400%) (AHRQ, 2008).  
Weights 
By applying the person-level weight and the variance weight, the mean and its 95% 
confidence interval of estimation were assessed (AHRQ, 2008). STATA version 10.0 was 
used for the statistical analyses and estimation. 
Results 
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The Medicare tax contribution by population of working age 
Based on the wage variable in MEPS, those under and over 65 years of age were 
separated. Those under 65 years of age contributed 95.2% and those over 65 years of age 
contributed 4.79% of a total $168 billion. Among those of working age, 15 to 64 years, the 
percentage of wageworkers differed in each income category. Wageworkers were 86.94%, 
81.36%, 73.66%, 69.28%, and 50.47% of the high income, middle income, low income, near 
poor, and poor/negative income categories, respectively. From a racial perspective, the white 
population had a higher proportion of wage earners during their working age, 81.23%, 
compared to 72.92% of the black, 75.22% of Hispanic, and 76.30% of the others. The 
Medicare tax contribution per capita and share of their contribution were listed in Exhibit 1 
with demographic proportions.  
Among the wage earners under 65 years of age, their contribution to Medicare tax 
was categorized by race and sex. In Exhibit 2, the percentage of contribution was listed with 
their categories. 
In Exhibit 2, the Medicare tax contribution by the enrollees above 65 years of age, 
covered by Medicare, indicated that the whites contributed 84.00% and they were 80.98% of 
the enrollees above 65 years of age. Even taking the Medicare tax contribution of the 
enrollees into consideration, the influences from the elder enrollees’ contribution was small, 
4.49% of the Medicare contribution from the young. 
Usage of Medicare cost sharing by the elder Medicare beneficiaries 
According to the data, Medicare is composed of four parts and the majority of 
Medicare tax flowed to part A. There was no information on exact spending in parts of A, B, 
C, and D of Medicare in MEPS. The Medicare cost sharing was estimated by the difference 
between the total expenditure and the self-payment. Categorized by race and sex, the share of 
the total subsidy for each subgroup is listed in Exhibit 3. Exhibit 4 compares the share of 
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Medicare tax contribution and the consumption of Medicare cost sharing by each race and 
sex. White females contributed 30.89% of Medicare tax and consumed 45.99% of Medicare 
cost sharing. Besides white females, black females and females of other races had larger 
percentage of the Medicare cost sharing than Medicare tax contribution. 
Discussion 
The differences in the Medicare tax contribution 
There are obvious differences in the probability of being wageworkers based on the 
poverty categories. Although the higher income groups tend to have a higher probability of 
wage work, 86% of the high-income working age group is paying for the Medicare tax. With 
significant negligence of catchment of Medicare tax collection, only 78.98% of all people of 
working age and who are working actually contributed to the Medicare fund. From the racial 
demographic breakdown, the percentage of contributing Medicare tax was higher for whites 
than the other races. The white demographic also tends to have higher income than the other 
races and this causes them to contribute more of the Medicare share (73.81%) than their 
population share (63.76%) during working age.  
The differences in Medicare cost sharing consumption 
Under the Medicare coverage, there were significant changes in the demographic 
characteristics in Exhibit 1 compared to those less than 65 years of age. The percentage of 
white males shifted from 32.11% of the working age to 34.42% of the Medicare enrollees 
above 65 years of age; white females increased from 31.73% of working age to 46.56% of 
Medicare enrollees above 65 years of age.  The percentage of the Medicare enrollees above 
65 years of age of other races was relatively smaller than the share of their counterpart of 
working age. These differences come from the longevity of the female and relative advantage 
of the white population, and increased number of young immigrants of races other than white, 
especially Hispanic origins (Rytina, 2009). In the survivorship curve published by CDC 
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(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), a significant decline in survivorship from 60 
years to 70 years among all races was detected, but decline occurred at an earlier age for the 
black male and black female (Arias, 2004). Therefore their chance of being insured by 
Medicare was relatively small. 
In terms of consumption of Medicare cost sharing, white females consumed 45.99% 
of the Medicare cost sharing and their per capita benefits of cost sharing was not the highest 
among all racial and sex categories. The relatively low per capita spending might reflect that 
they are relatively healthy, compared to other higher expenditure groups. Even though white 
females did not consume Medicare cost sharing significantly more than others, their 
longevity magnified their overall consumption and reliance on Medicare.  
Unfair redistribution 
Whether Medicare is a fair redistribution and social insurance mechanism is 
questionable from the results of the MEPS statistics. Medicare tax only accounted for 85% of 
the part A expenditure and, in general, 40% for all Medicare expenditure in 2010 (Henry J. 
Kaiser Family Foundation, 2009). The redistribution of Medicare proposed by the authors 
introduces the Medicare tax of mostly all races that are of working age to heavily subsidize 
the elderly.  
However, the way to define the disadvantaged population in a society that depends 
not only on their morbidity but also their chance of premature mortality is complicated.  In 
terms of mortality, the black male is posited as being the most vulnerable and disadvantaged. 
But the process of aging seems to merely strengthen the practice of treating the elderly rather 
than as those who suffer a premature death. Which one is fair, to subsidize the healthy when 
they are aged or help the ill when they are young? Does aging itself justify all kinds of 
subsidies, charity, and demands of the younger working population?  These questions beg to 
be explored from an ethical perspective. 
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Also, the results of inter-racial subsidies raised an interesting question: who should 
pay for the white grandmother, the black, the Hispanic, or the others? In designation literature 
regarding racial disparities in health, race is not only a proxy of disparities in SES (socio-
economic status) but also a social determinant in health (Kunitz, 2007). Why has Medicare 
left the racial and ethnic minorities more vulnerable under its own coverage (Families USA, 
2006), if every race contributed by the same rule? 
Further, the gender differences between all races in the consumption of Medicare cost 
sharing are obvious and worth discussion. In MEPS, the Medicare contribution and use of 
Medicare cost sharing can be estimated. It is true that the female demographic tends to 
consume more Medicare cost sharing with the exception of the Hispanic female.  Should all 
or only those of the same race pay for gender differences? 
The gender role of health spending has been discussed in health literature but much 
discussion has neglected the fact that longevity brings greater health expenditures in the long 
run (van Baal & Polder, 2008). In previous literature, gender difference in longevity was 
considered as a mixed result of social and biological factors (Kunitz, 2007). The imbalance 
between Medicare tax contribution and Medicare cost sharing usage pushes one to the 
question of whether the female demographic was deemed to produce less in money terms 
compared to their male peers of the same races, or whether our society did not provide a 
platform of values equal to their real contributions to society. 
Imbalance in Medicare tax contribution and benefit consumption collection 
Even the eligibility criteria require enrollees to have a prior 10-year contribution of 
social security tax and Medicare tax (Federal Insurance Contributions Act tax, FICA tax) 
(CMS, 2005). The cross-sectional results in MEPS statistics show that only part of earners 
contribute to the Medicare tax. In the end more than 97% of the elderly are enrolled in 
Medicare according to MEPS statistics. The asymmetry of discrete contribution in the 
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working population and universal coverage in later life is part of the sustainability problem in 
Medicare. 
More importantly, the Medicare tax and social security tax are not progressive. Wage 
earners of all income categories pay the same share of their income. Progressive tax imposes 
heavier percentage on the rich than the poor and this design will redistribute the social 
resources to the poor. Medicare tax does not redistribute more resources to the poor, 
imposing uniform tax rate on all wage earners. However, Medicare tax is still better in 
reducing the regressivity than the social security tax, which had a payment upper limit of up 
to $94200 in 2006.  
Help the minorities when they are alive 
The root cause of the inequity in intergenerational and inter-racial cross-subsidies 
arose out of the persistent differential survivorship of races and different patterns of wage 
earning. For the black male, their survivorship declines right after 65 years of age and other 
races have longer years in survivorship. The enrollment age, 65 years of age, leaves Medicare 
a platform of cross-subsidies for those suffering premature death to those enjoying longevity. 
To reverse the subsidies to the disadvantaged population, the author proposes that the 
resources need to be redistributed not only to the elderly, but also to those younger who 
suffer from premature mortality. 
Differently, the gender imbalance of longevity suggested another problem. Currently 
the female population is responsible for the majority of housework and child rearing (Kiger & 
Riley, 1996), which was not fully demonstrated in the national productivity statistics, 
especially the wage statistics. Gender norms in the society influence not only the practice of 
housework, but also the psychological environments for females. These gender norms can 
lead to discrimination (Sexton & Bowman-Upton, 2002). Hence, the author proposes a 
subsidy that adjusts for added years experience by females. A well designed redistribution 
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mechanism for late life preparation should help individuals of possible longevity, especially 
females, in reserving their resources and, at the same time, avoid depriving resources from 
those populations suffering from premature death to help them maximize utility in their life 
time.  
Sustainable intergenerational imperatives? 
 Since the system already entitles the elderly the right to benefit from the subsidies 
contributed by younger populations, does this system really warrant being repeated? Is there a 
moral imperative to sustain grandparents passed on to the next generation to guarantee 
subsidization of health expenditures? Does the support of grandparents obligatorily deprive 
the next generation? 
The answer does not turn out to be positive. The ongoing health reform does not treat 
the spending in Medicare as a necessary burden, but a focus of fiscal reform and a target for 
cost cutting (The Economist, 2009). The overwhelming growth of the Medicare budget has 
put pressure on governments to cut spending and postpone the enrollment age (The 
Economist, 2009). The fiscal problem reflects how fragile and weak the intergenerational 
promise may be. 
In 1965, when Medicare was first enacted, the life expectancy at birth was only 70.2 
(Anderson, 1998). The impact of aging was also diluted by the continued flow of younger 
immigrants. The unfairness embedded in Medicare was not a serious concern. At that time 
intergenerational subsidies were the only solution to finance the elderly’s health needs, even 
as those of 65 years of age and over had very little productivity. 
The authors suggest it is time for people to plan for their own later life. There is 
consistent evidence to show that individuals of different races, sexes, education, and income 
categories had different patterns of health and mortality (De Vogli, Gimeno, et al., 2008; 
Isaacs, & Schroeder, 2004). The inequities in Medicare will repeat generation after 
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generation if there is not a significant modification of its financing and subsidy designs. 
Therefore, how can society help the older generation lessen its reliance on subsidies provided 
by the wages of the younger generation?  
Policy Implication: How to Redesign the Redistribution? 
Instead of Medicare as it currently operates, the authors proposes that the financing of 
the elderly’s health expenditure requires early action and planning because the consumption 
era is significantly longer than the working age, mostly from 15 to 64 years of age, of one’s 
life time. A fair self-financing method is a matching mechanism of productivity period and 
the consumption-only later life. As mentioned, those suffering from premature death had less 
chance to consume later life services and individuals of longevity potential had the greater 
responsibility of preparing for themselves.  
However, health has uncertainty, especially in later life.  Insurance is a necessary way 
to help individuals of similar health risks be pooled together and avoid catastrophic health 
spending in later life. Individuals during their working age who are of similar racial, sex, 
education and socioeconomic status in the same age cohort are suitable to pool together, 
rather than repeating the interracial subsidization in Medicare.  For the marginalized or 
disabled groups, other social insurance, like Medicaid, acts like a larger pool to cover the 
special needs of the whole society. The next step is the discussion of which cohort and social 
strata should receive which kind of subsidies and support. After choosing the risk pools of 
cohorts, there are different levels of subsidies in the Medicare according to each one’s 
position relative to the federal poverty line. 
The Closure of the Generational Medical Debts: Inheritance Tax 
Because the practice of Medicare pooled the whole older generation together, how to 
fill the gap between their lifetime Medicare tax contribution and their health expenditure 
under Medicare became a generational question. Other literature also indicated that the 
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Medicare subsidies are far more than the lifetime contribution of the Medicare enrollees 
(Christensen, 1992). Because Medicare performs as insurance covering a whole generation, 
the unpaid amount raised another question: Could the unpaid amount, subsidies from 
Medicare, be seen as the medical debts of the whole generation?  If yes, the whole generation 
enjoying the benefits from Medicare has the responsibility of cleaning up their medical debts. 
A possible way to clean the medical debts of the generation is to collect the revenue from 
inheritance tax. Since the whole generation was socially insured together under the existing 
mechanism, all members of Medicare share the responsibility of cleaning up the medical 
debts of their generation. The safest way to pay without hurting their rights and health in their 
lifetime is an inheritance tax. If the problem of Medicare subsidies were inevitable in the 
beginning, the problem of unaffordability under Medicare forces one to consider the need to 
clean up the generational burden and restart a fair Medicare funding method. 
Conclusion 
Redistribution itself will not bring fairness; a well-designed and well-considered 
redistribution will. Medicare is not well designed especially in the transparent portion of its 
funding sources (42.25% financed by Medicare tax or 84.34% of Medicare part A). In other 
parts, Medicare did not provide a traceable source of financing, as with general revenue. 
Compared to the racial and sex composition of Medicare financing, the usage of cost sharing 
under Medicare coverage flowed to the population of longevity, especially the white female. 
This financial flow did not match the concept of redistribution to the disadvantaged. Because 
only the healthy population with better rates of survivorship extends their age to later life, the 
redistribution does not adjust for the previous health and relative social status, but aging only. 
The result is that the advantaged and possibly high-income groups were free from the fear of 
exaggeration of health expenditure in later life, while disadvantaged populations largely do 
not reach later life. 
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Inequity not only exists in Medicare consumption, but also in the collection of 
Medicare tax. In MEPS, the percentage of Medicare tax contribution was higher in the higher 
income category, but there was still more than 10% of the senior high-income group that 
avoided the responsibility of supporting the senior generation. In another perspective, social 
security tax and Medicare tax are both regressive, especially social security tax. The low-
income population suffered from the regressivity more than the high-income groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Editorial Note: The opinions expressed by authors represent those of the authors and do not reflect the 
opinions of the editorial staff of The Online Journal of Health Ethics. 
UNFAIR CONTRIBUTION AND CONSUMPTION IN MEDICARE                                 13 
 
The Online Journal of Health Ethics Volume 6, No. 2 December, 2010 
 
 
References 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2006).  Medical Expenditure Panel Survey: 
Survey Background.  Retrieved November 26, 2009, from 
http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/about_meps/survey_back.jsp 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2008).  2006 Full Year Consolidated Data 
File: Documentation.  Retrieved from 
http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/download_data/pufs/h105/h105doc.sh
tml 
Anderson, R. N. (1998).  United States abridged life tables, 1996. National Vital Statistics 
Reports, 47(13), 3-20. 
Arias, E. (2004).  United States life tables.  National vital statistics reports, 56(9), 2-6. 
Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical 
Insurance Trust Funds (2009).  2009 Annual Report of the Boards of Trustees of the 
Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust 
Funds. Retrieved from November 25, 2009, from 
https://www.cms.gov/ReportsTrustFunds/downloads/tr2009.pdf 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (2005).  Medicare Program - General 
Information: Overview.  Retrieved November 26, 2009, from 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareGenInfo/ 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (2009).  Medicare Managed Care Appeals & 
Grievances: Overview.  Retrieved November 26, 2009, from 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MMCAG/01_Overview.asp#TopOfPage 
Christensen, S. (1992).  The subsidy provided under Medicare to current enrollees.  J Health 
Polit Policy Law, 17(2), 255-264. 
UNFAIR CONTRIBUTION AND CONSUMPTION IN MEDICARE                                 14 
 
The Online Journal of Health Ethics Volume 6, No. 2 December, 2010 
 
 
De Vogli, R., Gimeno, D., et al. (2008).  Socioeconomic inequalities in health in 22 European 
countries.  N Engl J Med, 359(12), 1290; author reply 1290-1. 
Families USA (2006).  Medicare: Improving Health for a Growing Minority Population.  
Retrieved November 27, 2009 from http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/minority-
health-tool-kit/Medicare.pdf 
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation (2009).  Medicare Spending and Financing.  Retrieved 
November 26, 2009, from http:// www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7305-04-2.pdf 
Isaacs, S. L., & Schroeder, S. A. (2004).  Class - the ignored determinant of the nation's 
health.  N Engl J Med, 351(11), 1137-1142. 
Kiger, G., & Riley, P. J. (1996).  Gender differences in perceptions of household labor.  J 
Psychol, 130(4), 357-370. 
Kunitz, S. J. (2007).  Sex, race and social role--history and the social determinants of health.  
Int J Epidemiol, 36(1), 3-10. 
Rytina, N. (2009). Estimates of the Legal Permanent Resident Population in 2008.  Retrieved 
November 26, 2009 from 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_lpr_pe_2008.pdf 
Sexton, D. L., & Bowman-Upton N. (2002).  Female and male entrepreneurs: Psychological 
characteristics and their role in gender-related discrimination.  Journal of Business 
Venturing, 5(1), 7. 
The Economist. (2009, November 19).  Stemming the tide.  The Economist.  Retrieved 
November 27, 2009, from 
http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14903024 
van Baal, P. H., Polder, J. J., et al. (2008).  Lifetime medical costs of obesity: prevention no 
cure for increasing health expenditure.  PLoS Med, 5(2), e29. 
 
UNFAIR CONTRIBUTION AND CONSUMPTION IN MEDICARE                                 15 
 
The Online Journal of Health Ethics Volume 6, No. 2 December, 2010 
 
 
Exhibits 
Exhibit 1. The Medicare tax contribution by the working population 
    Population proportion 
Medicare tax by 
wage earners per 
capita 
Proportion of wage 
earners in working 
age population 
Medicare tax by 
all in working 
age per capita 
Share of Medicare 
tax contribution 
White Male 63.84% 32.11%  $1,158   $1,282  81.23% 85.38%  $941   $1,095  73.81% 42.94% 
  Female  31.73%   $1,021   77.08%   $787   30.89% 
Black Male 12.63% 5.97%  $853   $925  72.92% 73.20%  $622   $676  8.99% 4.51% 
  Female  6.66%   $793   72.68%   $576   4.49% 
Hispanic Male 16.25% 8.45%  $755   $801  75.22% 83.23%  $568   $667  10% 6.14% 
  Female  7.80%   $692   66.37%   $459   3.83% 
Others Male 7.27% 3.43%  $1,124   $1,311  76.30% 80.26%  $858   $1,053  7.20% 4.15% 
  Female  3.84%   $940   72.80%   $685   3.05% 
    100% 100%    $1,065  100% 100%   $841    100% 
Total amount 263,000,000         $168,000,000,000  
Note: author’s calculation according to MEPS in 2006 
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Exhibit 2. The Medicare tax contribution of the elderly covered by Medicare 
  
Total Population 
  Medicare tax contribution   
  
  
Contribution per capita 
White Male 80.98% 34.42%  $4,090,000,000  84.00% 54.28%   $335  
 Female  46.56%  $2,240,000,000   29.73%   $136  
Black Male 8.42% 3.34%  $196,000,000  5.03% 2.60%   $165  
 Female  5.08%  $183,000,000   2.43%   $102  
Hispanic Male 6.40% 2.75%  $439,000,000  7.54% 5.83%   $450  
 Female  3.65%  $129,000,000   1.71%   $100  
Others Male 4.20% 1.80%  $178,000,000  3.43% 2.36%   $279  
 Female  2.40%  $80,300,000   1.07%   $95  
  100.00% 100.00%  100.00% 100.00% 
Per capita for all 
groups 
Total population 
  35,439,720 Total amount  $7,535,300,000     $213 
Note: author’s calculation according to MEPS in 2006 
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Exhibit 3. The consumption of Medicare benefits 
  Population share 
Consumption of Medicare cost 
sharing Per capita 
White Male 80.93% 34.42% 78.94% 32.95%  $8,373   $8,042  
  Female  46.56%  45.99%   $8,619  
Black Male 8.44% 3.34% 9.56% 3.81%  $8,990   $8,914  
  Female  5.08%  5.75%   $9,040  
Hispanic Male 6.42% 2.75% 6.78% 3.40%  $8,815   $10,186  
  Female  3.65%  3.37%   $7,781  
Others Male 4.21% 1.80% 4.72% 1.49%  $8,869   $6,645  
  Female  2.40%  3.25%   $10,541  
    100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%   
 
Total 
population 35,339,719 
Total 
amount  $252,100,000,000  
For all 
races $7,117 
Note: author’s calculation according to MEPS in 2006 
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Exhibit 4. Comparison of Medicare tax contribution by population of working age and the 
Medicare benefits used by the elderly 
 
Note: author’s calculation according to MEPS in 2006 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
